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A growing interest in R&D tax incentive policies has given rise to a large number of
evaluations, which provide contrasting results about their effectiveness. Our meta-analysis
aims to explain the heterogeneity found in the R&D tax incentive evaluations by the features of
tax incentives. We document that on average R&D tax incentives stimulate R&D expenditures
across two streams of empirical studies. However, this averaged effect is moderated by the
underpinning features of tax incentives. Our samples evidence that the estimations linked
to incremental bases and related to targeted rules towards SMEs drive the positive results
found in the literature. Introducing a cap or a pre-approval process does not decrease the
effectiveness of R&D tax incentives, allowing governments to monitor the indirect support
needed to stimulate private R&D expenditures. Our results highlight the importance of setting
up a clear and stable tax incentives framework. Sources of uncertainty regarding the time-
span, the amount of the financial returns from tax claims but also the main criteria to apply
are likely to decrease their effectiveness in the short run.
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1 Introduction
It is well-known that firms under-invest in R&D activities due to the fundamental uncertainty
involved and the limited appropriability of knowledge (Arrow, 1972; Nelson, 1959). This market
failure combined with the existence of knowledge spillovers justifies the need for governmental
interventions. Governments use a variety of instruments to promote private research and innova-
tion efforts. R&D grants and tax incentives represent the main instruments to do so. Numerous
issues in the allocation (Faccio, 2006; Boeing, 2016) as well as in the use and compliance linked
to R&D grants (Czarnitzki & Fier, 2002; Boeing & Peters, 2019) reduce their effectiveness (see
Dimos & Pugh, 2016; Ugur et al., 2016, for an illustration). Shifting the subsidization of R&D
through the tax system instead of direct grants is thereby more likely to reward innovative firms
and to be more neutral on the direction of innovative efforts.
Due to these reasons, governments in many countries have adopted R&D tax incentives to
support innovation. A growing number of evaluations across countries and over time reflects this
increasing adoption. However, the results found in the literature remain unclear: Hall (1993);
Agrawal et al. (2020); Guceri & Liu (2019) find a strong and significant effect of R&D tax incen-
tives on R&D demand in the short run while Labeaga et al. (2014); Thomson (2009); Mulkay &
Mairesse (2013) find no effect with a few positive results in the long run (Mulkay & Mairesse,
2013; Labeaga et al., 2020). Thomson (2013) argues that the specificities of R&D tax incentives
implemented across countries explain the variations found in the literature.
We propose investigating the role of R&D tax incentives designs in a meta-analysis framework
to explain the discrepancies found across studies. We articulate dedicated variables character-
ising the design of R&D tax incentives with the set of micro-econometric results found in the
two streams of literature composing the empirical evaluations of R&D tax incentives on R&D
demand. By doing so, we supplement the meta-analysis of Castellacci & Lie (2015) by providing
an alternative source of explanation about the heterogeneity found across studies. Besides an
update of the literature, we further enhance the comparability of the estimates by transform-
ing them through a common metric (e.g. Partial Correlation Coefficients) and applying more
conservative inclusion criteria. We perform our analysis on micro-estimates exclusively reflect-
ing R&D demand evaluated in a given country and period to isolate the characteristics of the
underpinning R&D tax incentives scheme.
We find that on average R&D tax incentives stimulate the private R&D demand even if their
effects vary across tax schemes. Overall, our analysis underlines that recent estimates find a
decrease in the magnitude and significance level of the relationship between R&D tax incentives
and demand. This trend is reflected by a base definition that moderates the policy effectiveness:
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incremental base estimates show higher results than hybrid and volume-based ones. Those are
less likely to substantially affect R&D demand than incremental estimates. However, volume
and hybrid estimates show a significant impact on R&D demand when the underlying schemes
focus on SMEs via an immediate refund rule or a specific incentive rate. Relying on a cap to
target SMEs does not seem to alter the effectiveness of the policy, but it does not decrease
it either. Results are more ambiguous regarding the role of refund rules and the type of tax
incentive depending on the reference category taken into account. Finally, our results show that
governments can increase the predictability of the amount of foregone revenue through the use
of a pre-approval process or caps.
On the whole, our analysis stresses the importance of creating and sustaining a clear in-
stitutional framework to enhance the predictability of the firm’s financial returns from the tax
claims. Doing so raises the firms’ incentives to claim R&D deductions in the short run. The
paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides the rationale behind the different tax incen-
tives schemes, section 3 develops the empirical strategies and the meta-regression approaches
used, section 4 presents the results performed on the structural estimates. Section 5 discusses
the previous results by replicating the analysis with the direct estimates as robustness checks.
Section 6 summarizes the main results, limitations, and further avenues.
2 Tax incentives: theory and empirical evaluations
R&D tax incentives constitute an important indirect policy instrument to support private re-
search and innovation efforts. It relies on the following theory: the intersection of a downward
sloping demand for R&D, and an upward sloping supply of R&D inputs determines the optimal
level of private R&D. Ceteris paribus, R&D as an economic input becomes less expensive via
the reduction of the corporate tax burden linked to R&D tax incentives, as it stimulates firms’
demand for R&D (Hall, 1993). The reduction in corporate tax liability creates a tax shield,
which increases with the amount of eligible R&D expenditures defined by the tax law1. The
main advantages of R&D tax incentives lie in their stability and predictability. Contrary to
subsidies, they do neither require a budget, nor administrative units to monitor their use, and
are independent of political agendas (Bozeman & Link, 1984). Moreover, R&D tax incentives
reward innovative actors and reduce the risk of “picking losers” (Bozeman & Link, 1984; Deche-
zleprêtre et al., 2016). Firms receive financial rewards after and not before conducting R&D
activities. As it will become evident in the following subsections, firms’ incentives differ a lot
across schemes.
1The definition of eligible R&D expenditures differs among countries. Many countries refer to the Frascati
Manual which sets the benchmark for identifying R&D activities.
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2.1 Evolution of tax incentives over time
The design of R&D tax incentives reflects the approach that governments decide to develop in
order to tackle a changing global innovation environment. In the 1980s, governments heavily
relied on R&D subsidies as a key mechanism to sustain innovation efforts. In this context,
direct governmental interventions were justified by the need to sustain domestic firms’ innova-
tion efforts in an environment that became increasingly internationally competitive (see Spencer
& Brander, 1983). Globalization brought additional opportunities and pressures for domestic
firms in improving, or maintaining their position in international markets. The rise of the Asian
Tigers over this period provided the conditions for a boost in innovation efforts in high tech
sectors. In that sense, global R&D competition fell in line with Arrow’s argument according to
which competition provides incentives to efficiently organize production, lower costs, and stim-
ulate innovation (Arrow, 1972). Over this decade, the first tax incentives designs had mostly an
incremental base with carry-forward rules without differentiating between SMEs and large firms.
In the 1990s, capital mobility intensified as a result of financial globalization (Rodrik, 1998).
International organizations, such as the WTO, played a leading role in this process. In this
respect, the accession of China to the WTO marked a turning point in the nature of the inter-
national competition in high tech sectors. While firms at the frontier benefit from this trade
liberalization, laggards tend to suffer from an increase in international trade (Shu & Steinwender,
2019). The heterogeneity of this trade liberalization (see Aghion et al., 2005, for a theoretical
explanation) reduced on average the incentives to innovate. To lower costs, an increasing share
of manufacturing activities has been relocated from the Western world to eastern or Asian coun-
tries. This trend has focused the competition on lowering costs more than enhancing quality
and has put governments under pressure to increase their location attractiveness by reducing the
overall tax burden (Overesch & Rincke, 2011). This changing set of incentives at the interna-
tional level combined with the increasing competition to attract capital investments creates the
prerequisite for the development of tax competition. This has been translated by a decreasing
trend in corporate income taxes to attract high tax income activities related to high tech sectors
(e.g. “smart tax competition”)(Bräutigam et al., 2018). R&D tax incentives were then used as
an additional tool to maintain innovation efforts in a given country.
2.1.1 Types of R&D tax incentives: tax credits and super deductions
The most popular types of R&D tax incentives are tax credits, directly followed by super deduc-
tions (Straathof et al., 2014). Super deductions reduce the corporate taxable income (e.g. by
more than 100% of eligible R&D expenditures) while tax credits allow firms to deduct a given
percentage of their R&D expenditures from their corporate tax liability. These differences in the
source and timing of the tax relief impact its predictability. With regard to tax credits, firms
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only need to know the planned R&D spending and the applicable incentive rate to determine
the financial benefit. In contrast, to estimate the financial benefit of super deductions firms need
additional information on their overall expected tax position at the end of the year 2. There-
fore, R&D tax credits are easier to forecast than super deductions, which eases their integration
within firms’ R&D investment decisions (OECD, 2003). This argument has motivated countries
to shift from super deductions to tax credits, such as the British example in 20153. The pre-
dictability of the financial return of tax incentives is further influenced by the base definition,
and the refund rules. Those determinants are discussed in the following subsections.
2.1.2 Bases of R&D tax incentives: Incremental, volume or hybrid R&D tax in-
centives
As mentioned in subsection 2.1, the initial R&D tax incentives schemes were mostly incremen-
tal. An incremental base implies that only firms performing R&D expenditures above a given
threshold are eligible to claim R&D tax incentives. By the same token, it lowers the risk of
relabelling R&D expenditures as it is not sustainable to over- or underestimate R&D expendi-
tures in the long term (Larédo et al., 2016)4. The eligibility threshold is usually measured via
the averaged past R&D expenditures. Since this base only rewards additional R&D spending, it
reduces the risk of subsidizing windfall gains for existing R&D investments (Bozeman & Link,
1984). However, the reliance on a pre-defined threshold is a major drawback: the moving aver-
age of past R&D spending discourages firms to persistently increase R&D activities as current
R&D expenditures raise the future threshold5. This base definition tends to distort firms’ R&D
planning, as firms develop strategies to maximize their tax gains by gradually increasing their
R&D investment instead of doing a single large investment (Straathof et al., 2014; Correa et al.,
2013). The complexity of incremental tax incentives increases the compliance costs for both
governments and firms, who could even refrain from participating if the application costs are
perceived to be higher than the uncertain benefits.
The drawbacks of incremental bases listed above motivated the shift towards a volume-based
definition by considering the total amount of current R&D expenditures. By doing so, govern-
2The financial benefit of super deductions is the product of the additional deduction of taxable income and
the applicable marginal corporate income tax rate. The marginal tax rate is a result from several factors beyond
R&D expenditures which makes it difficult to plan over the long-term. In case of losses a firm’s applicable tax
rate is zero in the year the loss is incurred and, potentially, future years.
3R&D tax credits do not reduce the reported profitability of firms (reflected in pre-tax earnings). A public
consultation highlighted that especially multinational firms value the higher visibility of R&D tax credits, as
group capital is typically allocated based on firm performance, measured by pre-tax earings (HMTreasury, 2012).
4However, even within incremental designs there is the risk of relabelling if uncertainty remains in the definition
of qualifying R&D expenditures (Hall, 2001; Laplante et al., 2019) and if there is no direct connection to previous
R&D investments in the base definition.
5An alternative is the introduction of base amounts which are unrelated to current spending (e.g. the current
US incremental tax credit), increasing the risk of relabeling.
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ments decrease the administrations’ and the firms’ compliance costs related to tax incentives
(Larédo et al., 2016; Spengel, 2009). Likewise, the financial benefits of tax credits are more
generous and predictable from the firms’ perspective. In theory, more firms should hence claim
R&D tax credits under a volume-based scheme than in the case of incremental ones. This is
particularly true for SMEs with less persistent R&D efforts as they are more cash constraint
than larger firms (stronger market failure). The downside of this design is that it leaves more
room for R&D expenditures to be relabeled if applicants become more familiar with the appli-
cation procedure. In addition to this, there is an increased risk of subsidizing infra-marginal
R&D projects, which would have been conducted even in the absence of the R&D tax incen-
tives. To enhance extra R&D efforts, governments can extend volume bases with an incremental
component (e.g. hybrid bases). The combination of both base components aims at benefiting
from the best of both worlds (e.g. low application costs, and incentives to stimulate incremental
R&D expenditures) but comes at the price of increasing the complexity of the scheme. This
complexity and the higher threshold in R&D spending, which is inherent in hybrid as well as
incremental R&D tax incentives, represents a disincentive for firms to apply (Appelt et al., 2016;
Hall, 2019).
2.1.3 Predictability and generosity schemes from the firms’ perspective
Additional features such as refund rules, caps, and pre-approval affect the predictability and
generosity of R&D tax incentives, and therefore, their overall effectiveness. One reason to
explain the popularity of volume-based schemes lies in their attempt to better target SMEs.
R&D tax incentives are by definition addressed to firms with sufficient tax liabilities, creating
serious disparities between large and small firms in their capacity to benefit from this type
of policy. As highlighted in Bozeman & Link (1984), new firms may not be profitable and
hence, do not have enough tax liability in the early years in which they commercialize their first
products. Moreover, the risks involved in R&D activities may imply that large firms are more
equipped than SMEs to survive in the subsequent years to reap the tax benefits of innovation
activities (Bozeman & Link, 1984). To minimize these disparities between large and small firms,
governments can use two different refund options: carryforwards and immediate cash refunds.
Nowadays, most governments rely on carrying forward rules to benefit from unused R&D tax
credits in future periods6. As a result, firms do not lose the tax benefit due to insufficient
tax liability over a given year. However, since there is a considerable time lag between R&D
investments and expected revenues, small firms are more likely to benefit from an immediate
cash refund than carry-forward rules. Immediate refund rules work like a direct subsidy by
relaxing the financial constraints, typically higher among SMEs (Elschner et al., 2011)7. In
6This treatment is equivalent to loss-carryforwards in case of super deductions.
7Agrawal et al. (2019) show that SMEs are especially responsive to cash refunds as these companies face limited
amounts of free cash flow or do not have enough tax liability to make use of the R&D tax credit.
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addition to this, an immediate refund increases the predictability of the tax benefits, helping
its consideration within R&D investment strategies. Schemes without such refund rules are less
likely to be efficient. Even if firms are in principle eligible (based on their R&D spending),
they are less likely to claim a reduction of their tax burden if they do not have enough tax
liability (Hall & Van Reenen, 2000). Governments can also decide to target SMEs directly,
considering that they are less likely than large firms to benefit from R&D tax incentives. To do
so, governments could restrict the aforementioned cash refund to SMEs only, or simply provide
a higher funding rate than the one for large firms. With higher financial incentives, SMEs
should be more likely to bear the initial application costs for R&D tax incentives and to start
participating regularly.
2.1.4 Predictability for governments
While R&D tax incentives represent an instrument to sustain innovation efforts, they also imply
a large amount of foregone revenues for governments. To forecast this amount, governments can
introduce different rules to limit or monitor firms’ claims and to plan expenditures accordingly.
A first approach consists of introducing a cap in the amount of the possible tax benefit per
company. Doing so applies the binding constraints on the largest players but does not legally
discriminate across actors. However, such a limitation can severely reduce the incentives to
expand innovation activities, especially for firms that already spend a lot on research or are
approaching the cap (Appelt et al., 2016). Various countries that have implemented such caps
seem to reconsider the optimal level to boost incentives for medium-sized companies (Mulkay &
Mairesse, 2013; Agrawal et al., 2020; Cappelen et al., 2012). An alternative to closely monitoring
the amount of foregone tax relies on a pre-approval of the eligibility of the R&D expenditures.
Before being able to claim R&D tax deductions, firms have to apply to document the nature
of their R&D activities to be considered as eligible. Pre-approval increases the predictability of
the amount of eligible R&D expenditures for the government and for the claiming companies as
well. Nevertheless, pre-approval can be a costly process for both parties to audit the relevancy of
the project submitted. As previously seen, the interactions of several tax incentives features are
likely to provide different incentives to firms, and in turn, affect the magnitude and significance
of the results found in the literature. Our set of variables takes into account this diversity across
our samples.
2.2 Evaluating the impact of R&D tax incentives on R&D demand
Introducing a tax incentive means changing the relative costs of conducting R&D which should
increase firms’ incentives to intensify the R&D activities conducted. This type of evaluation
is called input additionality, in the sense that it looks at an increase in R&D as an input for
innovation. We can distinguish two main approaches to evaluate the impact of tax incentives.
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The first approach being structural and the second direct. In the former, the impact of tax
incentives is captured via a parameter, the user cost, which takes into account the reduction of
R&D costs. Doing so directly links the cost and demand for R&D and is typically measured via
an elasticity (e.g. log-log specification). Thus, structural approaches measure the percentage
change in R&D resulting from the tax relief for every percentage change in its after-tax price
(“the user cost of R&D”). The simplest version of user cost is defined as: UCi,t = 1−Ai,t1−τ ×(ri,t+δ),
where r refers to the real interest rate, δ to the depreciation rate of knowledge, τ to the corporate
income tax, and A to the net present value of capital allowances and deductions which reflect
the reduction in tax liability for each dollar used in R&D. In general, structural estimations can
be summarized as follows:
RDi,t = β0 + β1 × UCi,t + β2 ×Xi + β3 × Tt + εi,t (1)
In which Xi refers to firm fixed effects and Tt to year fixed effects (in a panel setting) and UC to
the user costs of R&D for a given firm (i) and period (t). The coefficient of interest is β1, estimat-
ing the R&D price elasticity. Estimations may vary if the researcher uses cross-sectional data,
relying on other firm controls than in a fixed effect approach. While very appealing to economi-
cally interpret the impact of tax incentives on firms’ R&D demand, structural approaches suffer
from endogeneity and selection. For this reason, authors increasingly rely on direct approaches
(e.g. difference-in-difference, RDD and quasi-experiments). While selection is not always tack-
led, the direct approach framework better tackles endogeneity by exploiting variations from the
eligibility, or from the tax scheme change criteria to assess the actual impact of tax incentives
on R&D demand. In the literature concerning direct approaches, R&D expenditures are di-
rectly regressed on a variable that serves as an indicator of the strength of R&D tax incentives
(Di,t) firm (i) faces in period (t). Whereas most authors rely on a binary indicator (Di,t) either
reflecting the general eligibility for the tax incentive or the actual treatment of the firm (e.g.
applied for tax incentives, received or eligible tax incentives), some authors use the absolute
firm-specific amount of R&D tax incentive received. Most of the evaluations in this stream of
literature relies on a difference and difference framework to estimate β1 as input additionality
by comparing the effect across a treatment and control groups.
RDi,t = β0 + β1 ×Di,t + β2 ×Xi + β3 × Tt + εi,t (2)
β1 interpretation is less straightforward than in the case of structural approaches that provides
an economic interpretation of the introduction of, or change within, the R&D tax incentive
scheme. However, the shift towards more causal interpretations in economic research made direct
approaches, and more especially diff-and-diff, the most popular way to assess input additionality
linked to tax incentives over the most recent period. Consequently, the two streams of literature
differ not only in terms of methodological contents but also through the types of R&D tax
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incentives evaluated. The design of R&D tax incentives has also evolved over time (see subsection
2.1) and the respective samples composing our study are both biased towards specific designs
(e.g. hybrid and incremental mostly evaluated in structural approaches and volume-based among
direct approaches). Combining both streams of evaluations allows us to reduce those biases in
order to provide a more accurate picture of the effect(s) of different designs.
3 Methods
Meta-analysis can be thought of as a collection of statistical analyses used to examine results from
individual studies with the general purpose of integrating findings of a given stream of literature
(Glass, 1976). Here, we rely on the meta-regression analysis framework introduced by Stanley &
Jarrell (1989) and Stanley (2001). Meta-regression analysis is a multivariate approach that aims
to assess the existence of a genuine statistical effect characterizing the evaluated set of studies and
underpinning sources of variations (i.e. the context of implementation, methodology). Doing so
provides an averaged effect of the relationship studied in a stream of literature, corrected from a
potential publication bias. The meta-analysis framework questions the validity of the empirical
results by “filter[ing] out systematic biases, largely due to misspecification and selection, already
contained in economics research” (Stanley, 2012, 13).
3.1 Data collection
We collected estimations from publications by crossing two main sources: Google Scholar and
IDEAS /RePEc. The selection of publication on Google Scholar relies on the following se-
mantic strategy: alltitle=’R&D tax*8. The strategy developed to extract publications from
IDEAS/RePEc differs slightly by relying on JEL codes9 standardized across economic fields and
countries. In accordance with the JEL code definitions, we combined each query with a key-
word search in the whole record (’R&D tax incentive’) (see Table 7 in the Appendix for more
details)10. Figure 2 in the Appendix summarizes the main steps of the selection process. The
data collection was performed between 3rd of May 2018 and 28th of September 201811. Only
French, Spanish, German, and English publications were used. Finally, we bound the analysis
to studies released between 1992-2020 to take into account the increasing use of econometric
techniques (GMM estimations with Arellano- Bond standard errors for structural approaches
8Various trials showed that specifying ’tax credit’ or ’tax incentives’ did not help in getting more relevant
studies. The variation in vocabularies across communities did not lead to the selection of specific keywords. The
advantage of ’tax*’ is to cover all potential variations of tax credits, tax reforms, tax incentives.
9https://ideas.repec.org/j/
10The drawback associated to our strategy lies in the multiple entries within IDEAS/RePEc due to the use of
multiple JEL codes within one publication, and co-authors uploading the paper on multiple depositories, creating
several duplicates. However, IDEAS/RePEc helped to complete the initial sample of publications which probably
did not refer to R&D taxes in their titles.
11We updated the data collection when new versions of manuscripts got released
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and diff-and-diff in direct approaches) in this field.
3.2 Inclusion criteria: structural and direct approaches
We collected the parameter of interest (e.g. β1 and its respective standard errors in Equation 1
and 2) linking R&D tax incentives and R&D demand. The data collection has been performed
on a subset of literature in both approaches following different criteria: i) the estimations must
be at the firm level and for a given country, ii) the estimations are only parametric (exclusion
of non-parametric estimations such as ATT). Parametric approaches control for other macroe-
conomic shocks affecting both treatment and control groups and any differences between the
two groups of firms that would be constant over time (Bozio et al., 2014). By doing so, we
compare more homogeneous estimates and can tackle the specificities of the tax incentives de-
signs characterizing a given country at the studied period. We added another restriction on
structural approaches by relying on estimations, which exclusively use the “King-Fullerton”, or
“Jorgenson-Hall” approach to estimate the user cost of R&D. The detailed steps involved in the
data collection and inclusion criteria are described in the PRISMA charts (see Figure 2 in the
Appendix).
Overall, our samples comprise 21 (structural) and 28 (direct) publications respectively from
which we gathered 227 and 502 estimates across the different studies (see Table 1). An overview
of the publications used to extract the short-term estimates is presented in Table 8 for structural
approaches and in Table 9 for direct approaches in the Appendix. As the literature focuses mostly
on short run effects on R&D, we restrict our analysis to this subset of comparable short-term
effects linked to the introduction or change(s) in R&D tax incentive designs. A few studies do
not find significant results in the short run because they consider the existence of adjustment
costs in claiming tax incentives and adapting the R&D activities (see Labeaga et al., 2014, for
an illustration). Those studies tend to rather find significant results in the long run. However,
the limited amount of literature that was available did not enable us to conduct the analysis
within this time frame.
3.3 Meta-Regression Analyis: framework, and modelling choices
The FAT-PET-PEESE (Funnel Asymmetry Test – Precision Effect Test - Precision Effect Es-
timate with Standard Error) is widely used in economics. This approach decomposes the value
of a given estimate in two key parameters. On the one hand, publication bias (FAT) and on
the other hand, the averaged true effect through a measure of precision (PET). Publication bias
represents a measure for the selectivity of the reported results characterising a subset of studies
based on the direction and statistical significance of the results (Rothstein et al., 2005, 3). In
this modelling context, the publication bias is a function of the standard error. Consequently,
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the averaged true effect measures the statistical relationship characterising the underpinning
subset of literature, net from publication bias. The FAT, which is also known as the Egger’s test
(Egger et al., 1997) is employed to test for the existence of publication bias, e.g. H0 : β1,i = 0.
This test relies on the assumption that researchers with small sample sizes select the most inter-
esting model(s). It postulates that reported estimates correlate with the size of their standard
errors. The net effect measured via the constant provides then the actual averaged (or true)
effect associated with the reported estimates characterising the underpinning subset of literature
(PET).
Estimatei = β0 + β1,i × SEi + εi (3)
In this context, a given estimate i can be decomposed into a publication selection bias, β1,i, and
β0 the true statistical effect.
3.4 PCC transformation
The diversity of methodologies in both streams of literature (i.e. elasticities with log-log spec-
ifications, semi-elasticities with lin-log elasticities, or even growth rates among structural ap-
proaches and DiD or treatment dummies among direct approaches) must be tackled to be able to
compare the statistical relationships between tax incentives and R&D demand. Figure 1 shows
the high diversity characterising the methodologies used to evaluate the impact of R&D tax
incentives across the two streams of literature. To be able to compare the statistical effect found
across studies, we convert the estimates to a common scale, e.g. Partial Correlation Coefficient
(PCC).
(a) Structural approaches (b) Direct approaches
Figure 1: Distribution of the methodologies across the two samples
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The PCC transformation takes into account the power of estimations with the degrees of
freedom and measures the statistical strength of the relationship between R&D tax incentives





where t refers to the t-ratio and df to the degrees of freedom of the relevant estimation. The
standard error for the PCC transformation is given by SEPCC =
√
(1−PCC2)
df . The PCC is quite
robust even if there are slight mismeasurements of the degrees of freedom as these are often
not explicitly reported in the primary estimates (Stanley, 2012)12. In line with the previous
subsection, the constant β0 remains the averaged true effect and β1 measures the publication
bias. Our equation 3 becomes:
PCCi = β0 + β1 × SEPCC,i + εi (5)
The drawback of using PCC lies in its interpretation: the estimations depict the strength of
the correlation between the two variables studied (e.g. introduction of tax incentives vs R&D
price and R&D demand). Doucouliagos (2011) conducts a meta-evaluation of the economic
literature to determine the distribution of PCC across subfields. In the case of politics and
taxes, Doucouliagos (2011) finds on average that a PCC under 0.015 refers to a weak statistical
correlation, between 0.015 and 0.037 the effect is medium, between 0.037 and 0.076 is high, and
above 0.076 is very high13.
3.5 Modelling approach
Following the framework developed by Stanley (2012, 2017), we use a weighted least squares
estimation of Equation 5 to account for the heteroskedasticity in the standard-errors composing
our samples and the existence of correlation of estimates coming from the same study s (see
Equation 6). With this transformation, the constant (β0) measures the publication bias while
β1 becomes the averaged true effect measured in a stream of literature. Equation 7 introduces
the extended meta-regression analysis in which additional variables are added to test their role
in moderating the averaged true effect, and explaining the variations found in the literature.
The Z variables are described in Table 1 and refer to the features of the R&D tax incentives
evaluated in a given study.
T-stati,s = β0 ×
1
SEPCC,i,s
+ β1 + vi,s (6)
12A general concern raised in the context of PCC transformation is the problem of asymmetric distribution if
the values get close to -1 and +1. However, the underlying datasets face no asymmetric distribution.
13For more details, see Table 4 in (Doucouliagos, 2011)
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We use the inverse of the standard errors as a weight and make a robustness check with the
inverse of the variance (PEESE approach)14. If not indicated otherwise, we use robust and
clustered standard errors at the study level to account for correlation among estimates from the
same study. This correlation might be the result of research choices in the estimation method,
or data sources for example. In our context of analysis, it is even more important to account for
dependencies within studies considering the diversity of the tax incentives schemes evaluated.
For the same reason, we do not add publication fixed effects which would make it impossible to
then test the specificities of the tax incentives designs evaluated15.
3.6 Summary statistics
The results of the data collection at the study level is summarized for both streams of literature
in the Appendix (see Tables 8 and 9). Table 1 describes the key variables for the analysis of
our study. As expected, estimates from structural approaches tend to find a negative relation-
ship between the price of R&D and its related demand. By contrast, direct approach estimates
find a positive relationship between decreasing the R&D costs and the related amount of R&D
performed. We observe that on average, structural approaches reveal more statistically signif-
icant results than direct approaches, which corresponds to the shift of the literature towards
more causal interpretations in economic evaluations. Table 2 suggests an alternative source of
variation between the two streams regarding their significance level. As indicated in the second
column, the majority of our estimates for structural approaches belongs to countries evaluated
in the 1980s and 1990s16.
On the contrary, direct approaches are rather concerned by the evaluations of recent schemes
(in the 2000s). Therefore, both samples have the advantage of being consistent with regard to the
underpinning macro trends in innovation policies and trade. Structural estimates are therefore
more likely to be associated with hybrid and incremental base evaluations than direct estimates,
focusing on volume-based evaluations. We take advantage of these specificities across samples
to get a more accurate picture of the evolution of tax schemes features and their respective
levels of efficiency. Alongside an over-representation of specific bases, our samples also face an
over-representation in a few select countries (US and Spanish estimates in structural approaches,
Belgium and British estimates in direct approaches). For this reason, we take those in the results
into account through various robustness checks. The shift towards volume-based schemes is also
14This PEESE approach is supposed to be more efficient in presence of heteroskedasticity (Stanley, 2012, 78)
15We could only observe variations from the period or the designs in a given country for France, Spain, Canada.
The set of related estimates was not large enough to exploit within-country variations.
1629 percent of the Canadian and all Dutch estimates evaluate a period which overlaps too much between the
late 1990s and the early 2000s to be able to code them in a category.
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underlined in Figures 3 and 4 in Appendix that map the respective values of the PCC coefficients
and their level of precision. Figure 3 suggests that incremental estimates among structural
approaches tend to find higher results even if they seem less precise than other evaluated bases.
Figure 4 supports this idea even if the volume-based estimates are over-represented in this sample
and exhibit a very high heterogeneity in terms of precision and efficiency.
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Table 1: Description and summary statistics of moderating variables
Variable Definition Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Structural
Outcome characteristics
PCC Partial correlation coefficient 227 −0.42 0.37 −0.99 0.72
TSTAT Estimated t-statistics of effect size 227 −5.04 6.88 −48 6
prec Inverse of the PCC standard error 227 18.33 19.70 2.26 98.09
prec_sq Inverse of the PCC variance 227 722.21 1,599.45 5 9,622
Tax scheme: Dummy variables are weighted by the inverse of the standard error of PCC
VolSE 1 if the tax scheme is volume-based, 0 otherwise 227 5.50 18.37 0 98.09
IncrSE 1 if the tax scheme is incremental, 0 otherwise 227 2.53 5.61 0 47
HybSE 1 if the tax scheme is hybrid, 0 otherwise 227 10.302 14.60 0 53
DeductionSE 1 if enhanced allowance, 0 if tax credit 227 2.19 7.82 0 69
CarryforwardSE 1 if carryforward available, 0 otherwise 227 14.75 20.54 0 98.09
ApprovalSE 1 if pre-approval required, 0 otherwise 227 3.412 7.923 0 37
CapSE 1 if overall tax benefit is limited, 0 otherwise 227 12.38 13.93 0 53
TargetedSE 1 if a given scheme targets SMEs, 0 otherwise 227 15.29 21.12 0 98.09
Direct
Outcome characteristics
PCC Partial correlation coefficient 502 0.03 0.05 −0.17 0.277
TSTAT Estimated t-statistics of effect size 502 1.99 3.31 −8.03 31.05
prec Inverse of the PCC standard error 502 71.27 37.71 6.01 203.53
prec_sq Inverse of the PCC variance 502 6,499.22 7,732.73 36.09 41,426
Tax scheme: Dummy variables are weighted by the inverse of the standard error of PCC
VolSE 1 if the tax scheme is volume-based, 0 otherwise 502 63.04 40.69 0 203.53
DeductionSE 1 if enhanced allowance, 0 if tax credit 502 42.43 41.21 0 182
CarryforwardSE 1 if carryforward available, 0 otherwise 502 65.89 41.87 0 203.53
ApprovalSE 1 if pre-approval required, 0 otherwise 502 5.89 20.35 0 112
CapSE 1 if overall tax benefit is limited, 0 otherwise 502 53.08 39.67 0 182
TargetedSE 1 if a given scheme targets SMEs, 0 otherwise 502 54.19 46.28 0 203.53
BaseSE 1 if a base scheme shifted towards volume, 0 otherwise 502 8.64 22.65 0 155
Note: The descriptive statistics are successively presented for our main sample of structural and direct approaches.
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Table 2: Composition of the samples at the country level (in share of observations)
|  Base definition |  Type | Refund rules |
Country Post2000 incremental hybrid volume deduction carry-forward targeted cap approval Obs.
Structural
Argentina 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.08
Australia 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.04
Canada 0.71 0.00 0.21 0.79 0.00 0.71 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.06
China 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.07
France 0.19 0.12 0.75 0.12 0.00 0.88 0.00 0.88 0.00 0.07
Japan 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.03
Netherlands - 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.04
Spain 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.32
UK 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.04
USA 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.27
Direct
Australia 1.00 0.00 0.25 0.75 0.25 1.00 1.00 0.17 0.00 0.02
Belgium 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.14
Canada 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.04
France 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Ireland 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.02
Italy 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.01
Japan 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.14
Mexico 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.01
Norway 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.07
Slovenia 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.001
Spain 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.01
Taiwan 1.00 0.00 0.67 0.33 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.33 1.00 0.02
UK 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.44
USA 0.07 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.08
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4 Results
We first present the main results from the meta-regression analysis linked to structural ap-
proaches (see Table 3) and discuss those in light of the specificities of the tax scheme designs
(see Table 4). We then extend the analysis by conducting the same tests with direct approaches
(see Tables 5 and 6). Crossing both sources of estimates allows us to provide a picture of the
chronological evolution of tax incentives design. The different country biases are discussed across
tables.
4.1 Structural approaches: overall effect over time
Table 3 provides the main results testing the existence of an averaged true effect linking the
impact of R&D tax incentives on R&D demand among structural approaches. We find a very
high, negative and significant effect of the averaged true effect across the different specifications
in columns 1 to 7. Put in other words, tax incentives associated with a reduction in the price
of R&D lead to a significant increase in its relative demand. The diverging results in columns 1
and 2 suggest a high level of heterogeneity in our sample, which is tackled differently across the
first two estimations (e.g. weighting with standard errors versus variance). As shown in Table
2, the large share of US and Spanish estimates may create biases towards those countries. We
test those in columns 3 to 7 by using a country dummy weighted by standard errors17. We find
that Spanish estimates tend to overestimate the impact of tax incentives on R&D demand (see
column 3) while the US estimates increase the averaged true effect of tax incentives (see columns
4-5). The proximity of the results estimated in columns 1 and 3 suggests that the estimation in
column 1 suffers from a bias related to Spanish estimates. Likewise, the estimation in column 2
via its variance weight gives a stronger role to the US estimates that results in a higher effect than
the rest of the sample. As a robustness check, we remove all unpublished estimates from Rao to
keep only Hall (1993) and Rao (2016) in column 5, ultimately limiting the over-representation
of US estimates in our sample. The results are not altered and the magnitude of the averaged
true effect is almost identical.
The last two columns (6 and 7) estimate the extent to which the country effects previously
described rather reflect specific evaluated periods (see Table 2). As suggested in subsection 2.1,
the designs of R&D tax incentives evolved towards volume-based schemes in the most recent
years. We chose the year 2000 as an arbitrary point to delineate between, on the one hand, the
early estimates from the 1980s and 1990s, and on the other hand, estimates from the 2000s18.
17We thereby assume that the specificities of the Spanish and US tax incentive schemes are likely to affect the
averaged true effect.
1812 observations related to three papers (i.e. Baghana & Mohnen (2009); Lokshin & Mohnen (2007, 2012)) are
dropped as they cannot be clearly assigned to either the late 1990s or 2000s. The estimates for the Netherlands
are therefore dropped and 29% of the Canadian estimates is not considered in the sample split across the two
17
We find a significant and negative effect characterising the strength between the R&D price and
its relative demand. However, the reported effect is lower in the 2000s than in the 1980s and
1990s. Furthermore, the Spanish bias predominantly arises from the estimates in the 2000s (see
column 7). Column 6 shows that on average the estimates related to the Spanish tax incentives
for the 1990s do not statistically affect the magnitude of the averaged true effect. Different
empirical evaluations of the Spanish R&D tax incentives in the early 2000s support our result
from column 7. Busom et al. (2014) list various determinants (i.e. unawareness, administrative
costs due to the complexity of the application process as well as a higher risk of an inspection
by tax authorities) as the main barriers for using R&D tax incentives. Consequently, firms have
few incentives to bear the cost of applying for tax credits and mostly use R&D subsidies to
sustain innovation efforts (Martínez-Azúa & Ros, 2009)19. The results from columns 6 and 7
show that the averaged efficiency across the two periods differs, which supports the idea that
the evolution of the designs relates to ambiguous results in the literature (see Table 2). The
next estimations sequentially assess the role played by the different R&D tax design features in
explaining the variations observed across the two periods.
4.2 Structural approaches: extended MRA with design features
Table 4 summarises the respective effect of the R&D tax incentives designs in moderating the
averaged true effects estimated in the literature linked to structural approaches. To control for
the country biases described before, we keep the same strategy by restricting our US estimates
to published ones. This allows us to control for (or drop in columns 6, 8-10) the recent Spanish
estimates depending on multicollinearity characterising the variables across the different models
(see Table 10 in the Appendix).
We start the analysis by testing the importance of the base definition in resolving the dis-
crepancy in the results found across the two studied periods (columns 1-5). Column 1 shows
that estimates related to an incremental base definition tend to find higher results than those
related to hybrid or volume-based estimates. On average, the magnitude of the averaged true
effect of incremental estimates is twice as large as the average true effect estimated for other
base estimates. The magnitude of the incremental estimates is in line with the one estimated
in column 6 in Table 3. Our results suggest that all schemes on average find an effect of R&D
tax incentives on R&D demand but this effect is only statistically different in the case of an
incremental base (see column 1). The limited amount of volume-based observations within the
sample reduces the chance to observe significant results related to this base definition (see col-
periods.
19Labeaga et al. (2020) report that claiming firms are rather motivated by reducing the corporate tax burden
than substantially increasing R&D expenditures. However, they also argue that if companies once bear the high
costs of learning how to claim, firms persistently claim R&D tax credits. This learning effect could explain the
higher effectiveness of long-run estimations found by Labeaga et al. (2014).
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umn 2). We extend the discussion on tax incentive bases in the subsample of direct approaches
shown in Table 5, in which volume-based estimates are more represented than among structural
approaches. Further, the results from column 3 show that only targeted hybrid and volume-
based schemes find significant results. To increase the comparability of the sample, we first
control for the US estimates (column 4) and exclude them as a robustness check (column 5).
We confirm that the US estimates exhibit much higher effectiveness than other countries’ esti-
mates. Moreover, we confirm the role played by incremental and targeted schemes estimates in
explaining the variations found in the literature.
Columns 6-10 test additional features that are likely to affect the predictability of the finan-
cial returns associated with R&D tax incentives. Carry-forward rules are tested in column 6 and
do not seem to affect the magnitude of the averaged true effect. More interestingly, columns 7
and 8 do not find a detrimental effect linked to introducing either a pre-approval process to apply
and a cap in R&D expenditures. From a governmental perspective, both determinants can help
to monitor and forecast the amount of the budget needed to support innovation efforts without
having a detrimental effect on the averaged effectiveness of R&D tax incentives. Finally, columns
9 and 10 focus on estimates linked to hybrid and volume bases to avoid reflecting a base effect20.
We find that relying on super deductions tend to reduce the averaged true effect of R&D tax
incentives. The estimation in column 10 supports the results found in columns 3 and 9. Only
targeted schemes and schemes based on tax credits find a statistically significant effect among
hybrid and volume-based estimates. Table 4 supports the idea developed before: the higher
averaged true effect estimated among early estimates is mostly driven by the definition of the
tax incentive base. The limited amount of volume-based observations within the sample reduces
the chance of observing significant results related to this base definition. Therefore, we extend
the discussion on tax incentive bases in the subsample of direct approaches shown in Table 5,
in which volume-based estimates are more represented than among structural approaches.
20Our sample does not provide estimates which combine an incremental base with a super deduction, and only
6 estimations combining a targeted and incremental scheme (see Table 2).
19
Table 3: FAT-PET estimations on structural approaches estimates
Dependent variable: t-value (PCC)
FATPET PEESE Spain US Published US Pre2000 Post2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
prec −0.142∗∗ −0.171∗∗∗ −0.170∗∗∗ −0.166∗∗ −0.380∗∗ −0.187∗∗∗
(0.066) (0.039) (0.063) (0.065) (0.173) (0.045)
prec_sq −0.227∗∗∗
(0.044)




Constant −2.433∗∗ 16.238 −2.694∗∗∗ −0.867 −1.061 −0.787 −1.302
(0.957) (34.882) (0.829) (1.088) (1.188) (1.677) (1.370)
Obs. 227 227 227 227 183 114 101
R2 0.167 0.540 0.208 0.247 0.218 0.276 0.397
Adjusted R2 0.163 0.538 0.201 0.240 0.209 0.263 0.385
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Robust standard errors and clustered at study level
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Table 4: Extended MRA: tax incentives designs (structural approaches)
Dependent variable: t-value (PCC)
Incremental Volume Targeted US wo US Carry Approval Cap Type Hybrid-Volume
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
prec −0.201∗∗∗ −0.283∗∗∗ −0.009 0.037 0.039 −0.251∗∗∗ −0.202∗∗∗ −0.209∗∗∗ −0.221∗∗∗ 0.076
(0.034) (0.106) (0.076) (0.048) (0.056) (0.054) (0.035) (0.043) (0.014) (0.067)
CarryforwardSE 0.044
(0.063)
IncrementalSE −0.214∗∗∗ −0.277∗∗∗ −0.206∗∗∗ −0.195∗∗ −0.210∗∗∗











TargetedSE −0.145∗ −0.204∗∗∗ −0.199∗∗∗ −0.298∗∗∗





Constant −1.369 −0.991 −1.558 −1.413 −1.393 −0.853 −1.439 0.489 −1.427 −1.556
(0.878) (1.035) (1.144) (1.095) (1.257) (1.047) (0.902) (1.149) (0.964) (1.015)
Obs. 182 182 182 182 165 146 182 146 122 122
R2 0.331 0.321 0.245 0.244 0.251 0.326 0.332 0.363 0.409 0.472
Adjusted R2 0.320 0.309 0.232 0.231 0.237 0.311 0.317 0.349 0.394 0.453
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Robust standard errors and clustered at study level
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5 Robustness checks with direct approaches
Estimations in Table 5 assess to which extent the results found in the literature on direct ap-
proaches are significant. In contrast to structural approaches, the magnitude of the averaged
true effect linked to R&D tax incentives decreases: our models depict a medium relationship
and not more a very high statistical relationship. This decreases in magnitude is consistent with
the use of more accurate methods to assess the causal impact of R&D tax incentives. Column
1 (FAT-PET approach) shows that these evaluations find on average a positive and significant
effect of R&D tax incentives on R&D demand. Whereas the PEESE estimation in column 2 pro-
vides contrasting results, in which the positive effect from column 1 vanishes. Column 2 suggests
that the initial result in column 1 reflects publication bias. As in Table 3, the variance weight
catches the heterogeneity differently across studies and signals a bias from an over-representation
of countries (here, the UK). To account for this, we compute an averaged true effect for all UK
estimates related to one specific tax incentive scheme (e.g. new eligibility criteria for medium-
sized companies to benefit from a higher credit rate) evaluated by two groups of co-authors
(Guceri, Dechezlepretre et al.) in column 321. This model includes publication fixed effects
and clusters standard errors at the co-authors’ group level to account for dependencies across
different versions of the manuscripts. Column 4 estimates a model for all other countries. The
UK shows a much higher level of statistical significance characterising the averaged true effect
than other countries. However, this higher significance is also affected by a stronger publication
bias. The working papers related to the evaluation of this scheme may create some noise in the
estimations. For that reason, we exclude those and keep only the most recent manuscripts of
Guceri & Liu (2019) and Dechezleprêtre et al. (2020) in columns 5-7. Columns 5-7 focus on
estimates belonging to the 2000s in order to replicate what we did in Table 3.
We find that on average recent estimates find a significant effect of R&D tax incentives in
stimulating the demand for R&D but differs across base definitions (see column 5): among our
recent estimates, we find that volume-based estimates show less significant results on R&D de-
mand than hybrid or incremental ones, in line with the results found in Table 4. The effect of
the volume-based definition is then divided into the related effect of shifting towards a volume-
based definition (column 6) and introducing a volume-based tax credit (column 7). Column
6 pools observations evaluating a change in a volume-based scheme (i.e. changing eligibility
threshold, rate, or base definition towards volume) while column 7 estimates a model linked to
the evaluation of the introduction of a volume-based scheme.
Splitting between the shift versus introduction of volume-based estimates substantially re-
21This set of estimations excludes the effects estimated in Guceri & others (2013) looking at the introduction
of R&D tax incentives to large UK firms. Doing so, we have more homogeneous estimates which mostly differ by
the output used to measure the R&D demand.
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duces the number of observations in each model, and hence leads to some country biases in each
sample. This bias is really strong in the last column in which half of the estimates relate to
Belgium. For this reason, we introduce a dummy to account for its over-representation in the
results22. Despite a lower number of observations, column 7 still shows a weak but significant
effect of the introduction of volume-based schemes while column 6 suggests that on average
estimations related to a shift within an existing tax incentive scheme do not find significant
results and are not more affected by a change in the base definition. This is consistent with
the idea that uncertainty reduces the effectiveness of R&D tax incentives (see subsection 2.1.3);
numerous changes over a short period of time create uncertainty and firms must adapt and
learn about this changing institutional landscape to benefit from R&D tax incentives (OECD,
2014). Beyond the type of volume-based phenomenon evaluated, additional features correlated
with the volume base definition could also explain the heterogeneity of the results found in the
literature. Next, we focus mostly on volume-based estimates to extend the results of the previ-
ous subsection and to examine the role of additional features within a more homogeneous sample.
Table 6 primarily focuses on volume-based estimates (see columns 1-5) to disentangle be-
tween the effect(s) from the volume base definition versus additional features of the evaluated
schemes23. Considering that dropping potential UK duplicates attenuates the UK bias (see col-
umn 5 in Table 5), we maintain the same strategy in Table 6. Our analysis starts by testing the
existence of a significant effect of volume-based estimates in stimulating R&D demand. Column
1 shows that on average volume-based estimates exhibit a small but significant positive impact
on R&D spending. The magnitude is in line with the results presented in Table 5. The next
estimations aim at unravelling the effect of additional features indirectly measured by the vol-
ume base definition, explaining the lower averaged effect found for the 2000s in comparison to
the earlier periods.
Like Table 4, the estimation in column 2 shows that a pre-approval process does not impact
the averaged true effect24. Similarly, the results estimated in column 3 support the results found
in Table 4 and specify the initial result from column 1: volume-based schemes with targeted
features enhancing SMEs applications find significant results. Column 5 also supports the results
found with structural estimations regarding the introduction of a cap: discriminating indirectly
between large firms and SMEs does not affect the averaged effectiveness of R&D tax incentives,
and even tends to enhance their effect. However, column 4 contradicts the results found in Table
22Even if the same shock is evaluated by two consequent reports, the estimates refer to distinct periods. We
decide to consider our Belgium control as a context of implementation, like a source of publication bias
23Column 6 adds incremental and hybrid observations to test the link between the type of tax incentive and
their effectiveness due to the limited amount of countries implementing super deductions in our sample. Column
7 relies on hybrid and volume-based estimates as a robustness check.
24The large share of Norwegian estimates implies to add a country dummy to catch the effect of pre-approval
and not of the Norwegian scheme.
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4 regarding the role of carry-forward rules. Using a carry-forward rule decreases the averaged
effectiveness of R&D tax incentives on R&D demand. This difference is mostly explained by the
reference categories that have been taken into account. In the first sample, we compare the effect
of carry-forwards to no specific possibilities to postpone the tax return. In the second sample,
we mostly compare carry-forwards vis-à-vis immediate refund rules. In line with our estimation
in column 3, immediate refund rules tend to increase the significance level of the averaged true
effect, which vanishes in the case of estimates related to carry-forward rules. Finally, column
6 re-introduces hybrid and incremental estimates in order to obtain enough variations in the
sample to test the role of the type of incentives. Among our set of direct estimates, we do not
find a statistical impact linked to using super deductions and not tax credits on the relationship
of tax incentives and R&D demand. Column 7 restricts the estimates to hybrid and volume-
based to test if the increase in the averaged true effect is driven by incremental estimates.
This last robustness check confirms the absence of the role played by the type of incentive (tax
credit versus super deduction) in explaining the variations observed in our direct sample and
the stronger effectiveness of incremental estimates in comparison to hybrid and volume-based
ones.
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Table 5: FAT-PET estimations
Dependent variable: t-value (PCC transformation)
FATPET PEESE UK ctrl wo UK Post2000 schemes Shift towards volume base Intro volume recent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
prec 0.026∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.031∗ 0.096∗∗∗ 0.027 0.090∗









Constant 0.164 1.224∗∗∗ 0.418∗∗∗ −0.083 −0.175 0.725 −0.885
(0.589) (0.366) (0.029) (0.751) (0.780) (0.733) (2.497)
Obs. 502 502 202 280 310 168 133
R2 0.085 0.075 0.170 0.109 0.214 0.174 0.398
Adjusted R2 0.083 0.073 0.140 0.106 0.209 0.164 0.389
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Robust standard errors and clustered at study level
Col 3 with study fixed effects and clustered standard errors at the co-authors’ level
25
Table 6: Extended MRA: tax incentives designs (direct approaches)
Dependent variable: t-value (PCC)
Volume Approval Targeted Carry Cap Type Type volume
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
prec 0.025∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.003 0.100∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗ 0.037∗













Constant 0.415 0.228 0.724 −0.016 −0.976 −0.131 −0.333
(0.644) (0.353) (0.696) (0.608) (0.948) (0.826) (1.011)
Obs. 295 295 295 295 295 348 307
R2 0.080 0.400 0.122 0.377 0.229 0.107 0.136
Adjusted R2 0.076 0.394 0.116 0.372 0.223 0.102 0.131
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Robust standard errors and clustered at study level
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6 Conclusion
Our meta-analysis aims to explain the reasons behind the heterogeneous results found in the
R&D tax incentives literature. We assess to what extent R&D tax incentives relate to an in-
crease in R&D expenditures and investigate the role of tax incentives features as an explanation
for the contrasting results found across evaluations. We supplement the meta-analysis published
by Castellacci & Lie (2015) by providing an alternative explanation related to the evolution of
R&D tax designs as the main source of variations found in the literature and by enhancing the
comparability of the estimates composing our samples.
We document with two streams of literature a positive impact of R&D tax incentives on
R&D demand. However, this effect is different across the studied period (before the 2000s and
after the 2000s) and depends on the evaluated designs. Estimates linked to incremental bases
find higher effects than hybrid or volume-based estimates. Our samples show that schemes im-
plementing an immediate refund rule, or a more generous credit rate to SMEs enhance their
effectiveness. Estimates related to more uncertain schemes (i.e. shift in the scheme features,
super deductions instead of tax credits, carry-forward versus immediate refund rules) find on
average less significant results than estimates associated to more clear and stable tax schemes.
Furthermore, introducing a cap or a pre-approval process does not relate to a decrease in the
averaged effectiveness of R&D tax incentives. Hence, both can be used by governments to bet-
ter plan the revenue foregone associated with R&D tax incentives. Overall, the results across
our samples highlight the importance of creating a clear and stable institutional framework to
claim R&D tax incentives in order to enhance its effectiveness. A specific attention to SMEs,
who are more likely to face financial constraints in funding their R&D activities, seems to be
an important driver in explaining their comparatively stronger response to tax incentives found
in the literature (see Agrawal et al., 2020; Guceri & Liu, 2019; Cappelen et al., 2010, for example).
Our study is not without limitations regarding the scope of our results, bounded to a lim-
ited number of countries and schemes. Despite numerous robustness checks, several countries
stand out as outliers. The large share of Spanish estimates related to hybrid schemes implies
that the reduced effectiveness of this scheme must be read with some caution. Moreover, each
sample is to some extent biased towards a specific base (incremental in structural and volume-
based in direct approaches), reflecting a trend in economics towards causal inference over time.
This methodological shift limits the comparative analysis of their respective effect(s) within one
stream of literature. This raises important questions how the way to evaluate the impact of
R&D tax incentives. Economists should conduct both types of analysis (i.e. structural and
direct) to provide causal effect(s) linked to R&D tax incentives on R&D demand but also quan-
tify their economic magnitude. Doing so would help to compare the effects of tax incentives
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across countries. Standardizing methodologies would also be needed to increase the compara-
bility of estimates. A better standardization of empirical evaluations would help to address
further sources of variations in a meta-analysis framework such as the interactions of R&D tax
incentives with other innovation, or tax policies. Ongoing efforts at the OECD may provide an
interesting source of estimations to perform an additional meta-analysis on the topic (OECD,
2020).
Finally, reviewing the dedicated literature on R&D tax incentives shows that fewer evalua-
tions look at the long-term effect on R&D additionality (see Mulkay & Mairesse, 2013; Labeaga
et al., 2014, as an illustration). This bulk of studies stresses the importance of adjustment costs
in learning how to claim, and the persistence of using this indirect instrument after bearing the
initial costs of claiming (Labeaga et al., 2020). Further research may also examine more sys-
tematically the impact of R&D tax incentives on output additionality. Evidence remains scant
(Czarnitzki et al., 2011; Dechezleprêtre et al., 2020) and intensifying the efforts would provide
an interesting lens to discuss R&D relabelling issues across schemes.
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Table 7: JEL codes
Category
H25 Business Taxes and Subsidies
H32 Firm
H42 Publicly Provided Goods
L13 Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
O38 Government Policy
O32 Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
O31 Innovation and Intervention: Process and Incentives
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Figure 2: Selection process and inclusion criteria
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B Estimates across publications and periods
Table 8: Composition of the structural approach sample: periods evaluated across studies
Study Country Period avg_PCCtstat obs
Agrawal et al. (2014) Canada 2000-2007 -18.23 10
Baghana & Mohnen (2009) Canada 1997-2003 -2.01 4
Crespi et al. (2016) Argentina 1998-2004 -8.76 18
Domínguez (2006) Spain 1991-1999 -2.54 4
Domínguez et al. (2008) Spain 1991-1999 -7.56 32
Fowkes et al. (2015) UK 2003-2012 -1.96 4
Guceri & Liu (2019) UK 2002-2011 -0,9 3
Hall (1993) USA 1980-1991 -9.41 5
Harris et al. (2009) UK 1998-2003 -5.87 1
Jia & Ma (2017) China 2009-2013 -1.43 16
Koga (2003) Japan 1991-1998 -8.89 6
Labeaga et al. (2014) Spain 2001-2008 -2.61 36
Lokshin & Mohnen (2007) Netherlands 1996-2004 -2.71 5
Lokshin & Mohnen (2012) Netherlands 1996-2004 -3.33 3
Mulkay & Mairesse (2008) France 1983-2002 5.71 1
Mulkay & Mairesse (2011) France 1981-2007 2.00 1
Mulkay & Mairesse (2011) France 1991-2003 -1.00 1
Mulkay & Mairesse (2011) France 2004-2007 0.81 4
Mulkay & Mairesse (2013) France 2000-2007 0.00 5
Mulkay & Mairesse (2018) France 1999-2007 -3.20 2
Mulkay & Mairesse (2018) France 2008-2013 -1.95 2
Rao (2010) USA 1981-1991 -8.99 2
Rao (2010) USA 1982, 1986-1990 -6.71 20
Rao (2013) USA 1986-1990 -4.11 22
Rao (2016) USA 1986-1990 -3.69 12
Thomson (2010) Australia 1990-2005 -0.07 8
Note: French estimates consider R&D adjustment costs in their estimations, exhibiting an increase in R&D in the long run.
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Table 9: Composition of the direct approach sample: periods evaluated across studies
Study Country Period avg_PCCtstat obs
Acheson & Malone (2020) Ireland 2007-2014 0.60 8
Agrawal et al. (2020) Canada 2000-2007 3.27 18
Aristei et al. (2015) Spain 2007-2009 1.85 3
Berger (1993) USA 1975-1989 3.40 2
Billings et al. (2001) USA 1992-98 1.04 2
Billings & Fried (1999) USA 1994 2.25 1
Bozio et al. (2014) France 2004-2010 2.87 6
Cantabene & Nascia (2014) Italy 2007-2009 2.34 4
Calderón-Madrid (2010) Mexico 2004-2007 2.46 6
Chen & Li (2018) Taiwan 2006-2014 4.12 3
Dechezleprêtre et al. (2020) UK 2006-2011 1.92 1
Dechezleprêtre et al. (2020) UK 2009 1.89 1
Dechezleprêtre et al. (2020) UK 2009-2011 2.63 34
Dechezleprêtre et al. (2020) UK 2010 2.50 1
Dechezleprêtre et al. (2020) UK 2011 2.52 1
Dechezleprêtre et al. (2016) UK 2006-2008, 2009-2011 1.42 5
Dechezleprêtre et al. (2016) UK 2009 2.05 1
Dechezleprêtre et al. (2016) UK 2009-2011 2.07 27
Dechezleprêtre et al. (2016) UK 2010 2.69 1
Dechezleprêtre et al. (2016) UK 2011 2.55 1
Dumont (2015) Belgium 2003-2011 0.13 35
Dumont (2019) Belgium 2003-2015 0.74 33
Guceri (2015) UK 1999-2007, 2009-2013 2.02 5
Guceri (2015) UK 2003-2006, 2008-2012 1.66 1
Guceri (2015) UK 2003-2006, 2009-2012 1.41 1
Guceri (2015) UK 2003-2007, 2009-2012 2.79 6
Guceri (2016) UK 2003-2006, 2009-2012 1.14 10
Guceri (2016) UK 2003-2006, 2010-2012 0.70 10
Guceri (2016) UK 2003-2012 1.50 10
Guceri (2013) UK 1998-2001, 2004-2006 1.50 10
Guceri (2013) UK 1998-2006 1.70 10
Guceri & Liu (2015) UK 2002-2006, 2009-2011 2.07 8
Guceri & Liu (2015) UK 2002-2011 1.01 30
Guceri & Liu (2017) UK 2002-2006, 2009-2011 2.53 8
Guceri & Liu (2017) UK 2002-2011 2.24 30
Guceri & Liu (2019) UK 2002-2006, 2009-2011 2.37 3
Guceri & Liu (2019) UK 2002-2007, 2009-2011 2.43 7
Haegeland & Møen (2007) Norway 1993-2005 6.22 35
Ho (2006) USA 1981-2013 1.43 24
Kasahara et al. (2014) Japan 2001-2003 1.11 20
Kobayashi (2014) Japan 2000-2003 1.01 12
Kobayashi (2014) Japan 2003 1.29 36
Paff (2005) USA 1994-1999 2.34 6
Ravšelj & Aristovnik (2020) Slovenia 2012-2016 3.76 2
Swenson (1992) USA 1975-1985 -1.10 3
Swenson (1992) USA 1975-1988 0.36 3
Thomson & Skali (2016) Australia 2005-2011 21.55 3
Thomson & Skali (2016) Australia 2011-2012 2.34 2
Thomson & Skali (2016) Australia 2012 1.14 7
Yang et al. (2012) Taiwan 2001-2005 2.22 6
Note: Chen & Li (2018)’s have been multiplied by -1,
accounting for the nature of the shock (abolition of tax incentives).
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Figure 4: Funnel plot: PCC transformation of direct estimates
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C Correlation matrices
Table 10: Correlation matrix of the key variables in the structural approaches sample without US unpublished studies




dedSE -0.09 0.13 0.26**
carrySE -0.17* 0.86**** 0.73**** 0.16*
appSE -0.14 0.04 -0.11 0.15* -0.28**
capSE 0.15* 0.36**** -0.29**** -0.28** 0.26** 0.09
hybSE -0.24** 0.36**** -0.28** -0.13 0.34**** 0.21** 0.88****
SpainpostSE -0.11 0.39**** -0.13 -0.12 0.43**** -0.20** 0.71**** 0.73****
∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01 ; ∗∗∗p<0.001 ; ∗∗∗∗p<0.0001
Table 11: Correlation matrix of the key variables in the direct approaches sample without UK unpublished studies
targetedSE incSE volSE dedSE carrySE appSE capSE
incSE -0.29****
volSE 0.73**** -0.42****
dedSE -0.07 -0.24**** 0.17**
carrySE 0.46**** 0.31**** 0.53**** 0.24****
appSE 0.16** -0.11* 0.14** -0.26**** -0.39****
capSE 0.17** 0.50**** -0.14* -0.05 0.12* 0.28****
hybSE 0.19** -0.05 -0.19** 0.30**** 0.18** 0.01 0.12*
∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01 ; ∗∗∗p<0.001 ; ∗∗∗∗p<0.0001
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